Constructions of truly practical secure protocols using standardsmartcards

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


In this paper we show that using standard smartcards it is possible to construct truly practical secure protocols for a variety of tasks. Our protocols achieve full simulation-based security in the presence of malicious adversaries, and can be run on very large inputs. We present protocols for secure set intersection, oblivious database search and more. We have also implemented our set intersection protocol in order to show that it is truly practical: on sets of size 30,000 elements takes 20 seconds for one party and 30 minutes for the other (where the latter can be parallelized to further reduce the time). This demonstrates that in settings where physical smartcards can be sent between parties (as in the case of private data mining tasks between security and governmental agencies), it is possible to use secure protocols with proven simulation-based security.
Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
StatePublished - 2008

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:Alexandria, VA, USA


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