The random-access memory (RAM) model of computation allows program constant-time memory lookup and is more applicable in practice today, covering many important algorithms. This is in contrast to the classic setting of secure 2-party computation (2PC) that mostly follows the approach for which the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In this work we design the first constant round maliciously secure two-party protocol in the RAM model. Our starting point is the garbled RAM construction of Gentry et al.  that readily induces a constant round semi-honest two-party protocol for any RAM program assuming identity-based encryption schemes. We show how to enhance the security of their construction into the malicious setting while facing several challenges that stem due to handling the data memory. Next, we show how to apply our techniques to a more recent garbled RAM construction by Garg et al.  that is based on one-way functions.
|Title of host publication||Theory of Cryptography - 14th International Conference, TCC 2016-B, Proceedings|
|Editors||Adam Smith, Martin Hirt|
|Number of pages||33|
|State||Published - 2016|
|Event||14th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2016-B - Beijing, China|
Duration: 31 Oct 2016 → 3 Nov 2016
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||14th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2016-B|
|Period||31/10/16 → 3/11/16|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Supported by the European Research Council under the ERC consolidators grant agreement no. 615172 (HIPS) and by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. First author’s research partially supported by a grant from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology (grant No. 3-10883).
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016.