Consignment contract for mobile apps between a single retailer and competitive developers with different risk attitudes

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65 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider n mobile application (app) developers selling their software through a common platform provider (retailer), who offers a consignment contract with revenue sharing. Each app developer simultaneously determines the selling price of his app and the extent to which he invests in its quality. The demand for the app, which depends on both price and quality investment, is uncertain, so the risk attitudes of the supply chain members have to be considered. The members' equilibrium strategies are analyzed under different attitudes toward risk: risk-aversion, risk-neutrality and risk-seeking. We show that the retailer's utility function has no effect on the equilibrium strategies, and suggest schemes to identify these strategies for any utility function of the developers. Closed-form solutions are obtained under the exponential utility function.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)949-957
Number of pages9
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume246
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Consignment
  • Risk attitude
  • Supplier competition
  • Supply chain

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