Conjunction and the Supreme Good in Bibago's commentary on the Metaphysics

In his Derekh Emunah, the fifteenth century Aragonian Jewish thinker, Abraham Bibago describes participation in the overflow of the Divine Intellect as the highest good for man and the expression of Divine Providence. Yet his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which is really a super-commentary on Averroes' Middle and Long Commentaries on the Metaphysics, only goes through the first ten books of the Metaphysics and is consequently missing Book Lambda. For Averroes, Metaphysics Lambda is the most important source for understanding the conjunction (itiṣāl) between human and divine intellect and its absence from Bibago's work means that he describes the conjunction in other terms. In this paper, I ask whether the absence of Book Lambda is intentional or accidental and whether and how that affected Bibago's own theory of conjunction. I also examine Bibago's account of substance in Book Z and of one in Book Iota to extract his theory of how human intellect can conjoin with the Divine Intellect.