Compact Protection Codes for protecting memory from malicious data and address manipulations

Gilad Dar, Avihay Grigiac, David Peled, Yagel Ashkenazi, Menachem Goldzweig, Yoav Weizman, Osnat Keren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


Compact protection codes (CPCs) provide optimal protection against fault injections attacks on memory arrays content. Nevertheless, CPCs fail to detect errors injected into the address itself. Consequently, an adversary can write a correct data word to an erroneous address without being detected. This paper presents an efficient code, dubbed AD-CPC, which detects both data manipulations and faults injected into the address decoder. No additional redundancy bits are required and no latency is introduced. In addition, the new encoding has a negligible effect on the error masking probability of the original CPC. We provide theoretical bounds and experimental results that support these claims. We show that with r additional redundant bits every error can be detected with probability of at least 1 - 3 • 2-r.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2021 IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2021
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781665418492
StatePublished - 24 May 2021
Event26th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2021 - Virtual, Bruges, Belgium
Duration: 24 May 202128 May 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings of the European Test Workshop
ISSN (Print)1530-1877
ISSN (Electronic)1558-1780


Conference26th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2021
CityVirtual, Bruges

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.


  • Error detecting codes
  • Fault injection attacks
  • Hardware security
  • Robust codes
  • Secure memory


Dive into the research topics of 'Compact Protection Codes for protecting memory from malicious data and address manipulations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this