Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller; Eilon Solan; Tristan Tomala

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller
, Eilon Solan
, Tristan Tomala

Tel Aviv University
HEC School of Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	222-234
Number of pages	13
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	74
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002
State	Published - Jan 2012
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The research of Heller and Solan was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 212/09). Tristan Tomala acknowledges the support of the HEC Foundation and of the French ANR under grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112. The authors thank an anonymous referee, Francoise Forges and Peter Vida for pointing an inaccuracy in the proof and providing comments that improved the presentation.

Funding

The research of Heller and Solan was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 212/09). Tristan Tomala acknowledges the support of the HEC Foundation and of the French ANR under grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112. The authors thank an anonymous referee, Francoise Forges and Peter Vida for pointing an inaccuracy in the proof and providing comments that improved the presentation.

Funders	Funder number
Israel Science Foundation	212/09
Fondation HEC	ANR-10-BLAN 0112

Keywords

Cheap-talk
Communication equilibrium
Distributed computation
Normal-form correlated equilibrium

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

Cite this

@article{a2ff6058e28b4f50adffaf3e48874670,

title = "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information",

abstract = "This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.",

keywords = "Cheap-talk, Communication equilibrium, Distributed computation, Normal-form correlated equilibrium",

author = "Yuval Heller and Eilon Solan and Tristan Tomala",

note = "Funding Information: The research of Heller and Solan was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 212/09). Tristan Tomala acknowledges the support of the HEC Foundation and of the French ANR under grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112. The authors thank an anonymous referee, Francoise Forges and Peter Vida for pointing an inaccuracy in the proof and providing comments that improved the presentation.",

year = "2012",

month = jan,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "74",

pages = "222--234",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

AU - Heller, Yuval

AU - Solan, Eilon

AU - Tomala, Tristan

N1 - Funding Information: The research of Heller and Solan was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 212/09). Tristan Tomala acknowledges the support of the HEC Foundation and of the French ANR under grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112. The authors thank an anonymous referee, Francoise Forges and Peter Vida for pointing an inaccuracy in the proof and providing comments that improved the presentation.

PY - 2012/1

Y1 - 2012/1

N2 - This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

AB - This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

KW - Cheap-talk

KW - Communication equilibrium

KW - Distributed computation

KW - Normal-form correlated equilibrium

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855191394

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:84855191394

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 74

SP - 222

EP - 234

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this