Coalition Formation with Multiple Alternatives of Interdependent Tasks

In this paper, we consider the problem of coalition formation in multi-agent systems that exhibit externalities. We consider multiple self-interested agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. Each agent may have several alternative sets of dependent tasks leading it to achieve its goal. Execution of tasks may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. In fact, to achieve their goals, the agents need to form sequential interdependent coalitions to perform their tasks within an alternative. However, tasks dependencies lead to coalitions dependencies. To account for the effects of each coalition on the rest of the possible coalitions, the agents need to form all needed coalitions at once. This problem, denoted here as a One-shot Coalition Formation Problem (OCFP ), is quite challenging and particularly important for multi-agent system. We describe it and present a multi-lateral negotiation mechanism that solves it by allowing the agents to conduct iterative negotiations on their respective tasks within their alternatives. A heuristic-based approach that considers the distance between each agent’s desired alternative and other agents’ proposed coalitions is introduced and evaluated.