Blazing fast 2PC in the offline/online setting with security for malicious adversaries

Yehuda Lindell, Ben Riva

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

57 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recently, several new techniques were presented to dramatically improve key parts of secure two-party computation (2PC) protocols that use the cut-and-choose paradigm on garbled circuits for 2PC with security against malicious adversaries. These include techniques for reducing the number of garbled circuits (Lindell 13, Huang et al. 13, Lindell and Riva 14, Huang et al. 14) and techniques for reducing the overheads besides garbled circuits (Mohassel and Riva 13, Shen and Shelat 13). We design a highly optimized protocol in the offline/online setting that makes use of all state-of-the-art techniques, along with several new techniques that we introduce. A crucial part of our protocol is a new technique for enforcing consistency of the inputs used by the party who garbles the circuits. This technique has both theoretical and practical advantages over previous methods. We present a prototype implementation of our new protocol. This is the first implementation of the amortized cut-and-choose technique of Lindell and Riva (Crypto 2014). Our prototype achieves a speed of just 7 ms in the online stage and just 74 ms in the offline stage per 2PC invoked, for securely computing AES in the presence of malicious adversaries (using 9 threads on a 2.9GHz machine). We note that no prior work has gone below one second overall on average for the secure computation of AES for malicious adversaries (nor below 20ms in the online stage). Our implementation securely evaluates SHA-256 (which is a much bigger circuit) with 33 ms online time and 206 ms offline time, per 2PC invoked.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages579-590
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9781450338325
DOIs
StatePublished - 12 Oct 2015
Event22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015 - Denver, United States
Duration: 12 Oct 201516 Oct 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Volume2015-October
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityDenver
Period12/10/1516/10/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 ACM.

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