An AMD circuit over a finite field 𝔽 is a randomized arithmetic circuit that offers the “best possible protection” against additive attacks. That is, the effect of every additive attack that may blindly add a (possibly different) element of 𝔽 to every internal wire of the circuit can be simulated by an ideal attack that applies only to the inputs and outputs. Genkin et al. (STOC 2014, Crypto 2015) introduced AMD circuits as a means for protecting MPC protocols against active attacks, and showed that every arithmetic circuit C over 𝔽 can be transformed into an equivalent AMD circuit of size O(|C|) with O(1/|𝔽|) simulation error. However, for the case of the binary field 𝔽 = 𝔽2, their constructions relied on a tamper-proof output decoder and could only realize a weaker notion of security. We obtain the first constructions of fully secure binary AMD circuits. Given a boolean circuit C and a statistical security parameter σ, we construct an equivalent binary AMD circuit C' of size |C| · polylog(|C|, σ) (ignoring lower order additive terms) with 2 −σ simulation error. That is, the effect of toggling an arbitrary subset of wires can be simulated by toggling only input and output wires. Our construction combines in a general way two types of “simple” honest-majority MPC protocols: protocols that only offer security against passive adversaries, and protocols that only offer correctness against active adversaries. As a corollary, we get a conceptually new technique for constructing active-secure two-party protocols in the OThybrid model, and reduce the open question of obtaining such protocols with constant computational overhead to a similar question in these simpler MPC models.
|Title of host publication||Theory of Cryptography - 14th International Conference, TCC 2016-B, Proceedings|
|Editors||Adam Smith, Martin Hirt|
|Number of pages||31|
|State||Published - 2016|
|Event||14th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2016-B - Beijing, China|
Duration: 31 Oct 2016 → 3 Nov 2016
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||14th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2016-B|
|Period||31/10/16 → 3/11/16|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The second author was supported by ERC starting grant 259426, ISF grant 1709/14, BSF grant 2012378, a DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1228984, 1136174, 1118096, and 1065276. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the ARL under Contract W911NF-15-C-0205. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government.
The third author was supported by ERC starting grant 259426 and a Check Point Institute for Information Security grant for graduate students and post-doctoral fellows.
The first author is a member of the Check Point Institute for Information Security and was supported by ERC starting grant 259426; by the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center; by the Israeli Centers of Research Excellence I-CORE program (center 4/11); by the Leona M. & Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust; and by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in the Framework of “Science for Peace".
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016.
- AMD circuits
- Algebraic manipulation detection
- Secure multiparty computation