Blateralism versus multilateralism in international economic law: Aplying the principle of subsidiarity

This article proposes a different perspective on the problem of bilateralism versus multilateralism than has been offered in the literature to date. The author proposes to look at the problem through the prism of the subsidiarity principle. While this principle has mainly been used in the context of allocation of authority between various levels of government in federal or quasi-federal systems of government, it is here proposed to use it in the analysis of the various layers of international economic law and in relation to the choice of bilateral, regional, or plurilateral regimes over multilateral ones. Such an analysis can provide both a normative criterion and an explanatory tool in relation to the reality of booming bilateralism. The objective of the article is to develop parameters analogous to those used in the federalist discourse but adapted to the subject matter of international economic law. These parameters incorporate both the efficiency and the political/ethical rationales of the subsidiarity principle, which dictates, in particular, that actions should be taken on less centralized levels, closer to the point of action, where measures more precisely targeted and more closely attuned to the need of the parties involved may be undertaken. Through this perspective, just as well-functioning provincial and local governments may serve as building blocks for a leaner, better functioning, and more democratic central government, bilateral and regional regimes may serve as important building blocks for a leaner, better functioning, and more democratic multilateral organization.