Abstract
A generalization of mixed strategy equilibrium is proposed, where mixed strategies need only be finitely additive and payoff functions are not required to be integrable or bounded. This notion of best-response equilibrium is based on an extension of the idea that an equilibrium strategy is supported in the player’s set of best-response actions, but is applicable also when no best-response actions exist. It yields simple, natural equilibria in a number of well-known games where other kinds of mixed equilibrium are complicated, not compelling or do not exist.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1317-1334 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 52 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
Keywords
- Best-response equilibrium
- Finitely additive probability
- Mixed strategy