BELIEF-LIKE IMAGINING AND CORRECTNESS

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Abstract

This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we “direct” our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, “mimic” beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)147-160
Number of pages14
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume58
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2021

Bibliographical note

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© 2021 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

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