Avoid ability and libertarianism: A response to fischer

David Widerker, Charlotte Katzoff

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Scopus citations


Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer's contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker's criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker's criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer's first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ii) the version of libertarianism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarianism he proposes, avoidability remains a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)415-421
Number of pages7
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 1996


Dive into the research topics of 'Avoid ability and libertarianism: A response to fischer'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this