Abstract
Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1121-1142 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | British Journal of Psychology |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2022 The Authors. British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The British Psychological Society.
Funding
The authors thank Mattan Ben Shachar for reviewing the ‘data preparation and exclusion’ R code. They also thank Neta Raz and Mareike Westfal.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Mattan Ben Shachar |
Keywords
- automaticity
- cognitive control
- free will belief
- self-control