Auction mechanisms for preference driven ad exchanges

Rina Azoulay, Esther David

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


In this paper we concentrate on ad exchange mechanisms that take into consideration the publishers' preferences concerning the attributes of ads published in their ad space, in addition to their desire to earn money from the ads. We suggest allocation (ad placement) and pricing protocols which take into account preferences of both the publishers and the advertisers. The most promising protocol, the Weighted Bipartite Hungarian VCG protocol, collects the preferences of the auction's participants and uses the Hungarian algorithm to maximize a weighted function of their preferences. Simulations show that this advantageous protocol can maintain a balanced budget over time while preserving most of the desired economic properties (e.g., individual rational, and truth telling), and reaches near optimal solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-236
Number of pages34
JournalMultiagent and Grid Systems
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

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© 2017 - IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved.


  • Agent-based marketplaces
  • ad exchanges
  • auction markets


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