Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments

David Sarne; Meirav Hadad; Sarit Kraus

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20

Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments

David Sarne, Meirav Hadad, Sarit Kraus

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tasks dynamically arrive from a central manager. The agents differ in their capabilities to perform a task under different world states. Previous models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a joint goal are not applicable in such environments, since self interested agents have a motivation to deviate from the joint allocation strategy, in order to increase their own benefits. Given the allocation protocol set by the central manager, a stable solution, is a set of strategies, derived from an equilibrium where no agent can benefit from changing its strategy given the other agents' strategies. Specifically we focus on a protocol in which, upon arrival of a new task, the central manager starts a reverse auction among the agents, and the agent who bids the lowest cost wins. We introduce the model, formulate its equations and suggest equilibrium strategies for the agents. By identifying specific characteristics of the equilibria, we manage to suggest an effi-cient algorithm for enhancing the agents' calculation of the equilibrium strategies. A comparison with the central allocation mechanism, and the effect of environmental settings on the perceived equilibrium are given using several sample environments.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004
Editors	Matthias Klusch, Sascha Ossowski, Vipul Kashyap, Rainer Unland
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	271-285
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Print)	3540231706
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20
State	Published - 2004
Event	8th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2004 - Erfurt, Germany Duration: 27 Sep 2004 → 29 Sep 2004

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Volume	3191
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743

Conference

Conference	8th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2004
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Erfurt
Period	27/09/04 → 29/09/04

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20

Cite this

Sarne, D., Hadad, M., & Kraus, S. (2004). Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments. In M. Klusch, S. Ossowski, V. Kashyap, & R. Unland (Eds.), Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004 (pp. 271-285). (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science); Vol. 3191). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20

Sarne, David ; Hadad, Meirav ; Kraus, Sarit. / Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments. Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004. editor / Matthias Klusch ; Sascha Ossowski ; Vipul Kashyap ; Rainer Unland. Springer Verlag, 2004. pp. 271-285 (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)).

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author = "David Sarne and Meirav Hadad and Sarit Kraus",

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Sarne, D, Hadad, M & Kraus, S 2004, Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments. in M Klusch, S Ossowski, V Kashyap & R Unland (eds), Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 3191, Springer Verlag, pp. 271-285, 8th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2004, Erfurt, Germany, 27/09/04. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20

Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments. / Sarne, David; Hadad, Meirav; Kraus, Sarit.
Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004. ed. / Matthias Klusch; Sascha Ossowski; Vipul Kashyap; Rainer Unland. Springer Verlag, 2004. p. 271-285 (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science); Vol. 3191).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tasks dynamically arrive from a central manager. The agents differ in their capabilities to perform a task under different world states. Previous models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a joint goal are not applicable in such environments, since self interested agents have a motivation to deviate from the joint allocation strategy, in order to increase their own benefits. Given the allocation protocol set by the central manager, a stable solution, is a set of strategies, derived from an equilibrium where no agent can benefit from changing its strategy given the other agents' strategies. Specifically we focus on a protocol in which, upon arrival of a new task, the central manager starts a reverse auction among the agents, and the agent who bids the lowest cost wins. We introduce the model, formulate its equations and suggest equilibrium strategies for the agents. By identifying specific characteristics of the equilibria, we manage to suggest an effi-cient algorithm for enhancing the agents' calculation of the equilibrium strategies. A comparison with the central allocation mechanism, and the effect of environmental settings on the perceived equilibrium are given using several sample environments.

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Sarne D, Hadad M, Kraus S. Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments. In Klusch M, Ossowski S, Kashyap V, Unland R, editors, Cooperative Information Agents VIII - 8th International Workshop, CIA 2004. Springer Verlag. 2004. p. 271-285. (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_20

Auction equilibrium strategies for task allocation in uncertain environments

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