Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes

Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Tal Mor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack," causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.

Original languageEnglish
Article number012329
JournalPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 21 Jul 2014
Externally publishedYes


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