TY - JOUR
T1 - Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes
AU - Boyer, Michel
AU - Gelles, Ran
AU - Mor, Tal
PY - 2014/7/21
Y1 - 2014/7/21
N2 - We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack," causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.
AB - We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack," causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904604574&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevA.90.012329
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevA.90.012329
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AN - SCOPUS:84904604574
SN - 1050-2947
VL - 90
JO - Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
JF - Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
IS - 1
M1 - 012329
ER -