Attacks on fixed apparatus quantum key distribution schemes

Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Tal Mor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider quantum key distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on a choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution (QKD) is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has a one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack" causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent QKD implementations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory and Practice of Natural Computing - First International Conference, TPNC 2012, Proceedings
Pages97-107
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event1st International Conference on the Theory and Practice of Natural Computing, TPNC 2012 - Tarragona, Spain
Duration: 2 Oct 20104 Oct 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7505 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference1st International Conference on the Theory and Practice of Natural Computing, TPNC 2012
Country/TerritorySpain
CityTarragona
Period2/10/104/10/10

Keywords

  • Implementation loopholes
  • Quantum Cryptography
  • Quantum Key Distribution
  • Security

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