TY - JOUR
T1 - At the last minute
T2 - the use of the prime minister's power to amend the agenda during a crisis
AU - Shpaizman, Ilana
AU - Gilad, Sharon
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Coalition management is challenging, especially during the agenda-setting stage. The prime minister has to balance the priorities of the coalition partners, ministers from her party, and broader government priorities. To meet this challenge, the prime minister has agenda-setting power. Most research has studied the agenda-setting power during periods of stability. This paper asks how a crisis affects prime ministers' use of agenda-setting power by looking at the use of one discretionary agenda-setting rule: amending the agenda at the last minute. We use unique data from Israeli cabinet meetings over a period of 21 years and three crises, comparing prime ministers' last-minute changes to the agenda. We find that prime ministers are less inclined to change the agenda at the last minute during crises, and when they do so, this power is often, but not exclusively, deployed for crisis management. These findings suggest that crisis decreases the pressures exerted by prime ministers' party members and coalition partners, allowing prime ministers more latitude to promote their priorities without recourse to manipulation. The findings underscore the importance of coalition dynamics, coalition management, and agenda setting for crisis management.
AB - Coalition management is challenging, especially during the agenda-setting stage. The prime minister has to balance the priorities of the coalition partners, ministers from her party, and broader government priorities. To meet this challenge, the prime minister has agenda-setting power. Most research has studied the agenda-setting power during periods of stability. This paper asks how a crisis affects prime ministers' use of agenda-setting power by looking at the use of one discretionary agenda-setting rule: amending the agenda at the last minute. We use unique data from Israeli cabinet meetings over a period of 21 years and three crises, comparing prime ministers' last-minute changes to the agenda. We find that prime ministers are less inclined to change the agenda at the last minute during crises, and when they do so, this power is often, but not exclusively, deployed for crisis management. These findings suggest that crisis decreases the pressures exerted by prime ministers' party members and coalition partners, allowing prime ministers more latitude to promote their priorities without recourse to manipulation. The findings underscore the importance of coalition dynamics, coalition management, and agenda setting for crisis management.
KW - Cabinet
KW - coalition government
KW - crisis
KW - prime minister
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105010451582
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2025.2527321
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2025.2527321
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AN - SCOPUS:105010451582
SN - 1350-1763
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
ER -