Abstract
§49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment concludes with a striking claim regarding the freedom required for artistic expression. Kant classifies Mannerism as aping, but considers manner the only valid means of artistic expression. These opposed uses of maniera echo a historical controversy, which finds reconciliation in Kant in what I call artistic autonomy. For Kant, artistic expression of genuine originality requires autonomous action, the individual manner in which an artist selects, transforms and applies given academic rules, in a way that renders an aesthetic vision meaningful. His grave concern is that artists, in their aspiration to innovate, might make the freedom to modify and transform rules into the very aim of their artistic endeavor. In order to grasp the full significance of Kant's view, I examine the contradictory attitudes towards maniera articulated by Vasari and Bellori. Kant's account of artistic autonomy offers an understanding of artistic succession, different from that of his predecessors.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 45-60 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2024 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
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