Approval voting with costly information

Michael Gershtein, David Sarne, Yonatan Aumann

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


In many approval voting settings voters are a priori uncertain regarding their true preferences, yet can obtain this information if willing to incur some cost. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of such model focusing in simultaneous and sequential voting. The analysis enables demonstrating that costly preference-related information acquisition changes some inherent model properties. In particular, the introduction of such cost may lead to all sorts of manipulations in the sequential case, resulting in an assortment of examples where the latter is dominated by simultaneous voting and vice versa. This, as opposed to the case where such information is freely available, where it can be proved that the two variants are truthful and equivalent. These findings suggest important implications to policy makers and the designers of voting systems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 1st International Conference on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, DAI 2019
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
ISBN (Electronic)9781450376563
StatePublished - 13 Oct 2019
Event1st International Conference on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, DAI 2019 - Beijing, China
Duration: 13 Oct 201915 Oct 2019

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series


Conference1st International Conference on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, DAI 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.


  • Approval Voting
  • Computational Social Choice
  • Information Acquisition
  • Mechanism Design
  • Sequential Voting
  • Simultaneous voting
  • Social Welfare


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