Appenzeller to Brie: Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Mixed-Mode Arithmetic and Z2k

Carsten Baum, Lennart Braun, Alexander Munch-Hansen, Benoit Razet, Peter Scholl

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs are highly flexible cryptographic protocols that are an important building block for many secure systems. Typically, these are defined with respect to statements that are formulated as arithmetic operations over a fixed finite field. This inflexibility is a disadvantage when it comes to complex programs, as some fields are more amenable to express certain operations than others. At the same time, there do not seem to be many proofs with a programming model similar to those found in modern computer architectures that perform arithmetic with 32 or 64 bit integers. In this work, we present solutions to both of these problems. First, we show how to efficiently check consistency of secret values between different instances of zero-knowledge protocols based on the commit-and-prove paradigm. This allows a protocol user to easily switch to the most efficient representation for a given task. To achieve this, we modify the extended doubly-authenticated bits (edabits) approach by Escudero et al. (Crypto 2020), originally developed for MPC, and optimize it for the zero-knowledge setting. As an application of our consistency check, we also introduce protocols for efficiently verifying truncations and comparisons of shared values both modulo a large prime p and modulo 2k. Finally, we complement our conversion protocols with new protocols for verifying arithmetic statements in Z2k. Here, we build upon recent interactive proof systems based on information-theoretic MACs and vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE), and show how this paradigm can be adapted to the ring setting. In particular, we show that supporting such modular operations natively in a proof system can be almost as efficient as proofs over large fields or bits, and this also easily plugs into our framework for zero-knowledge conversions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages192-211
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)9781450384544
DOIs
StatePublished - 12 Nov 2021
Externally publishedYes
Event27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021 - Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 15 Nov 202119 Nov 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityVirtual, Online
Period15/11/2119/11/21

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 ACM.

Funding

This work is supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 803096 (SPEC), the Carlsberg Foundation under the Semper Ardens Research Project CF18-112 (BCM), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. HR001120C0085. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Distribution Statement “A” (Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited).

FundersFunder number
European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme803096
Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencyHR001120C0085
European Commission
CarlsbergfondetCF18-112

    Keywords

    • commit and prove
    • conversion
    • rings
    • zero-knowledge protocols

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