An inspection game between an inspector, an unknown attacker and an inspectee

Does implementing profiling at borders, as opposed to not profiling individuals, effectively deter potential attackers? To address this inquiry, we examine an inspection scenario involving an inspector, an attacker, and a recruited passenger (referred to as the inspectee). In this setup, the inspector must handle a continuous flow of passengers at an inspection point, with passengers categorized into different risk groups based on profiling. The inspector lacks information about the private potential loss associated with detecting the attacker, as well as the inspectee’s private motivation to break the law. The attacker selects an inspectee from one of the groups without knowledge of the individual’s private motivations. Our findings reveal that with profiling in place, attackers recruit from various passenger groups, including those less likely to engage in illegal activities. Furthermore, the use of profiling may incentive attackers facing high potential losses to recruit inspectees, a behavior they might avoid under a no-profiling policy. The inspector shows a preference for attackers who tend to recruit from groups less inclined to break the law. However, surprisingly, the inspector also favors attackers who recruit from groups with a higher likelihood of law violation.