Abstract
Many day-to-day tasks require negotiation, mostly under conditions of incomplete information. In particular, the opponent's exact tradeoff between different offers is usually unknown. We propose a model of an automated negotiation agent capable of negotiating with a bounded rational agent (and in particular, against humans) under conditions of incomplete information. Although we test our agent in one specific domain, the agent's architecture is generic; thus it can be adapted to any domain as long as the negotiators' preferences can be expressed in additive utilities. Our results indicate that the agent played significantly better, including reaching a higher proportion of agreements, than human counterparts when playing one of the sides, while when playing the other side there was no significant difference between the results of the agent and the human players.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | ECAI 2006 |
| Subtitle of host publication | 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 - September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy |
| Editors | Gerhard Brewka, Silvia Coradeschi, Anna Perini, Paolo Traverso |
| Publisher | IOS Press BV |
| Pages | 270-274 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781586036423 |
| State | Published - 2006 |
Publication series
| Name | Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications |
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| Volume | 141 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0922-6389 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1879-8314 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:1 This research was supported in part by NSF under grant #IIS-0208608. 2 Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900. email: {linraz,sarit}@cs.biu.ac.il 3 Institute of Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland. 4 Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. email: [email protected] 5 Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. email: [email protected]
Funding
1 This research was supported in part by NSF under grant #IIS-0208608. 2 Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900. email: {linraz,sarit}@cs.biu.ac.il 3 Institute of Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland. 4 Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. email: [email protected] 5 Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. email: [email protected]
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| National Science Foundation | -0208608 |