An agent design for repeated negotiation and information revelation with people

Noam Peled, Ya'akov Gal, Sarit Kraus

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

Many negotiations in the real world are characterized by incomplete information, and participants' success depends on their ability to reveal information in a way that facilitates agreement without compromising the individual gains of agents. This paper presents a novel agent design for repeated negotiation in incomplete information settings that learns to reveal information strategically during the negotiation process. The agent used classical machine learning techniques to predict how people make and respond to offers during the negotiation, how the y reveal information and their response to potential revelation actions by the agent. The agent was evaluated empirically in an extensive empirical study spanning hundreds of human subjects. Results show that the agent was able to outperform people. In particular, it learned (1) to make offers that were beneficial to people while not compromising its own benefit; (2) to incrementally reveal information to people in a way that increased its expected performance. The approach generalizes to new settings without the need to acquire additional data. This work demonstrates the efficacy of combining machine learning with opponent modeling techniques towards the design of computer agents for negotiating with people in settings of incomplete information.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Pages789-795
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Conference

Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period14/07/1318/07/13

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:USA

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