All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

Yuval Heller

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.002

All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

Yuval Heller

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Existing solution concepts assume that players receive simultaneously correlated recommendations from the mediator. An ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno and Wooders, 1996) is immune to deviations that are planned before receiving the recommendations. In this note we focus on mediation protocols where players may get their recommendations at several stages, and show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages of the protocol.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	184-188
Number of pages	5
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	69
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.002
State	Published - May 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Coalition-proofness
Common knowledge
Incomplete information
Non-cooperative games
Strong correlated equilibrium

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10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.002

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All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

Abstract

Keywords

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