Advice and trust in games of choice

Cody Buntain, Jennifer Golbeck, Dana Nau, Sarit Kraus

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This work provides a game theoretic framework through which one can study the different trust and mitigation strategies a decision maker can employ when soliciting advice or input from a potentially self-interested third-party. The framework supports a single decision maker's interacting with an arbitrary number of either honest or malicious (and malicious in varying ways) advisors. We include some preliminary results on the analysis of this framework in some constrained instances and propose several avenues of future work.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2012 10th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2012
Pages157-158
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event2012 10th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2012 - Paris, France
Duration: 16 Jul 201218 Jul 2012

Publication series

Name2012 10th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2012

Conference

Conference2012 10th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2012
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityParis
Period16/07/1218/07/12

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