Abstract
This paper seeks to explore whether the interpretation of legal standards is influenced by decision-makers’ substantive decision. Prior literature on motivated reasoning has shown that decision-makers “shift” their perception of evidence in their desired direction. To the extent this logic applies to legal-standards, we should expect decision-makers to adjust the perception of the legal standard accordingly—e.g., one’s decision to favor the plaintiff would induce a pro-plaintiff interpretation of the required threshold to win a case. We present the results of two experiments in which we asked subjects to report their interpretation of the applicable legal threshold after deciding a case, under different legal thresholds. Our participants, by and large, did not shift the legal standard to conform to their substantive decision, contrary to the theoretical expectations. We thus conclude that decision-makers treat the legal standard distinctly than regular evidence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 33-53 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | European Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Feb 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
Funding
We thank Ilana Ritov, Dan Simon, Theresa Squatrito, Eyal Zamir, and participants in the tribute workshop in honor of Theodore Eisenberg, the Italian Society of Law and Economics annual conference, and the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe for useful discussions and comments. We thank Ofir Givaty, Daniel Fishelovich, and Sharon Salinas for excellent research assistance. This research project was supported by the Israeli Science Foundation (Grant No. 1251/15).
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Italian Society of Law and Economics | |
| Israel Science Foundation | 1251/15 |
Keywords
- Coherence-shifts
- Dismissal standards
- Empirical legal studies
- Legal thresholds
- Twombly