Abstract
Side channel attacks have become a major threat to hardware systems. Most modern digital IC designs utilize sequential elements which dominate the information leakage. This paper reports the first unified analysis and comprehensive comparison of known secure flip-flop circuits. We present a device level analysis of the information leakage from these FFs and propose several evaluation metrics to quantify their security. We show that simulated PA attacks that utilize the information evaluated by these metrics at the gate-level extract more information at the module-level.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 8094119 |
Pages (from-to) | 24797-24809 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | IEEE Access |
Volume | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Nov 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2013 IEEE.
Funding
The work of O. Keren was supported by the Israel Science Foundation under Grant 923/16. The work of A. Fish was supported by the Israel Science Foundation under Grant 1868/16.
Funders | Funder number |
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Israel Science Foundation | 923/16, 1868/16 |
Keywords
- CPA
- Cryptography
- DPA
- countermeasures
- flip-flops
- power analysis
- sequential-circuits
- synchronous