A Strategic Negotiations Model with Applications to an International Crisis

Sarit Kraus

doi:10.1109/21.214793

A Strategic Negotiations Model with Applications to an International Crisis

Sarit Kraus

Department of Mathematics

University of Maryland, College Park

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

The area of automated negotiation has been of particular interest in AI due to the important role negotiations play in facilitating understanding and the achievement of cooperation among entities with differing interests, whether they be individuals, organizations, governments, or automated agents. A strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers, is presented with specific application to international crises. In the model, both players can opt out, and while one loses over time, the other gains (up to a point). Specific issues are: conflicting objectives and utility functions of parties and the impact of time on bargaining behavior in crisis. The general model has relevance to the hostage crisis from which it was built, and subsequent applicability in building an automated negotiation agent for experimental and training purposes.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	313-323
Number of pages	11
Journal	IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
Volume	23
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/21.214793
State	Published - 1993

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Manuscript received March 16, 1990; revised May 26, 1992. This work was supported by the NSF under grant lRI-9123460. Part of this work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Advanced Computer Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD. S. Kraus is with the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 52900. J. Wilkenfeld is with the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. IEEE Log Number 9205803.

Funding

Manuscript received March 16, 1990; revised May 26, 1992. This work was supported by the NSF under grant lRI-9123460. Part of this work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Advanced Computer Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD. S. Kraus is with the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 52900. J. Wilkenfeld is with the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. IEEE Log Number 9205803.

Funders	Funder number
National Science Foundation	lRI-9123460

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10.1109/21.214793

Cite this

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abstract = "The area of automated negotiation has been of particular interest in AI due to the important role negotiations play in facilitating understanding and the achievement of cooperation among entities with differing interests, whether they be individuals, organizations, governments, or automated agents. A strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers, is presented with specific application to international crises. In the model, both players can opt out, and while one loses over time, the other gains (up to a point). Specific issues are: conflicting objectives and utility functions of parties and the impact of time on bargaining behavior in crisis. The general model has relevance to the hostage crisis from which it was built, and subsequent applicability in building an automated negotiation agent for experimental and training purposes.",

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A Strategic Negotiations Model with Applications to an International Crisis

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