The area of automated negotiation has been of particular interest in AI due to the important role negotiations play in facilitating understanding and the achievement of cooperation among entities with differing interests, whether they be individuals, organizations, governments, or automated agents. A strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers, is presented with specific application to international crises. In the model, both players can opt out, and while one loses over time, the other gains (up to a point). Specific issues are: conflicting objectives and utility functions of parties and the impact of time on bargaining behavior in crisis. The general model has relevance to the hostage crisis from which it was built, and subsequent applicability in building an automated negotiation agent for experimental and training purposes.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Manuscript received March 16, 1990; revised May 26, 1992. This work was supported by the NSF under grant lRI-9123460. Part of this work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Advanced Computer Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD. S. Kraus is with the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 52900. J. Wilkenfeld is with the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. IEEE Log Number 9205803.