TY - UNPB
T1 - A random-sampling double-auction mechanism
AU - Segal-Halevi, E.
AU - Hassidim, A.
AU - Aumann, Y.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to ∞ at a similar rate.
AB - Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to ∞ at a similar rate.
UR - https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=0BI-noIAAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=0BI-noIAAAAJ:D_sINldO8mEC
U2 - 10.48550/arXiv.1604.06210
DO - 10.48550/arXiv.1604.06210
M3 - פרסום מוקדם
VL - 6210
BT - A random-sampling double-auction mechanism
ER -