A quantitative version of the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem for three alternatives

Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every nondictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a nonnegligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives in its range.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)934-952
Number of pages19
JournalSIAM Journal on Computing
Volume40
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Algorithmic game theory
  • Arrow theorem
  • Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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