A practical cryptanalysis of the algebraic eraser

Adi Ben-Zvi, Simon R. Blackburn, Boaz Tsaban

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a novel cryptanalysis of theAlgebraic Eraser primitive. This key agreement scheme, based on techniques from permutation groups, matrix groups and braid groups, is proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20, which is intended for authentication of RFID tags. SecureRF, the company owning the trademark Algebraic Eraser, markets it as suitable in general for lightweight environments such as RFID tags and other IoT applications. Our attack is practical on standard hardware: for parameter sizes corresponding to claimed 128-bit security, our implementation recovers the shared key using less than 8 CPU hours, and less than 64MB of memory.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology - 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016, Proceedings
EditorsMatthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages179-189
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9783662530177
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016
Event36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 14 Aug 201618 Aug 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9814
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period14/08/1618/08/16

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A practical cryptanalysis of the algebraic eraser'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this