A note on restricted majority rules: Invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness

Drora Karotkin, Shmuel Nitzan

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Abstract

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always the worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (WMRs). In the current paper we establish two additional special properties of RMRs. First, given a particular configuration of the group members' decisions, the collective choice is invariant to the selection of WMRs if it is invariant to the selection of RMRs. Second, given a particular decision profile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a distinctive collective choice which is different from the choice of any other potentially optimal WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-274
Number of pages6
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume13
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1996

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