A feasible and practical coalition formation mechanism leveraging compromise and task relationships

Samir Aknine, Onn Shehory

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recent studies have shown that compromise may facilitate coalition formation and increase agent utilities. In this study we leverage on those results. We devise a novel coalition formation mechanism that enhances compromise. Our mechanism can utilize information on task relationships to reduce formation complexity. The suggested mechanism works well with both cardinal and ordinal task values. Via experiments we show that the use of the suggested compromise-based coalition formation mechanism provides significant savings in the computation and communication complexity of coalition formation. Our results also show that when information on task relationships is used, the complexity of coalition formation is further reduced. We demonstrate successful use of the mechanism for collaborative information filtering, where agents combine linguistic rules to analyze documents' contents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT 2006 Main Conference Proceedings), IAT'06
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages436-439
Number of pages4
ISBN (Print)9780769527482
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes
Event2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'06 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: 18 Dec 200622 Dec 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT 2006 Main Conference Proceedings), IAT'06

Conference

Conference2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'06
Country/TerritoryChina
CityHong Kong
Period18/12/0622/12/06

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