Abstract
Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main compatibilist alternatives to the account are unsatisfactory; and finally (d) by defending it against a general criticism of certain libertarian theories made by Derk Pereboom.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 87-108 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Philosophical Explorations |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2009 |
Keywords
- C. Moya
- D. Pereboom
- actionally accessible alternative
- free will
- semi-compatibilism
- source-compatibilism
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