Abstract
MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It is widely deployed in Japan, and is recognized internationally as a European NESSIE-recommended cipher and an ISO standard. After almost 20 years of unsuccessful cryptanalytic attempts, a first attack on the full MISTY1 was presented at CRYPTO 2015 by Yosuke Todo. The attack, using a new technique called division property, requires almost the full codebook and has time complexity of 2107.3 encryptions. In this paper we present a new attack on the full MISTY1. It is based on Todo’s division property, along with a variety of refined key-recovery techniques. Our attack requires almost the full codebook (like Todo’s attack), but allows to retrieve 49 bits of the secret key in time complexity of only 264 encryptions, and the full key in time complexity of 269.5 encryptions. While our attack is clearly impractical due to its large data complexity, it shows that MISTY1 provides security of only 270 — significantly less than what was considered before.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Advances in Cryptology - 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016, Proceedings |
Editors | Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 435-456 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783662530177 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2016 |
Event | 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016 - Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 14 Aug 2016 → 18 Aug 2016 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 9814 |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Santa Barbara |
Period | 14/08/16 → 18/08/16 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016.
Funding
A. Bar-On – This research was partially supported by the Israeli Ministry of Science, Technology and Space, and by the Check Point Institute for Information Security.
Funders | Funder number |
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Check Point Institute for Information Security | |
Ministry of Science, Technology and Space |