TY - GEN
T1 - 1/p-secure multiparty computation without honest majority and the best of both worlds
AU - Beimel, Amos
AU - Lindell, Yehuda
AU - Omri, Eran
AU - Orlov, Ilan
N1 - Place of conference:Santa Barbara, Claifornia
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - A protocol for computing a functionality is secure if an adversary in this protocol cannot cause more harm than in an ideal computation, where parties give their inputs to a trusted party which returns the output of the functionality to all parties. In particular, in the ideal model such computation is fair - all parties get the output. Cleve (STOC 1986) proved that, in general, fairness is not possible without an honest majority. To overcome this impossibility, Gordon and Katz (Eurocrypt 2010) suggested a relaxed definition - 1/p-secure computation - which guarantees partial fairness. For two parties, they construct 1/p-secure protocols for functionalities for which the size of either their domain or their range is polynomial (in the security parameter). Gordon and Katz ask whether their results can be extended to multiparty protocols. We study 1/p-secure protocols in the multiparty setting for general functionalities. Our main result is constructions of 1/p-secure protocols that are resilient against any number of corrupt parties provided that the number of parties is constant and the size of the range of the functionality is at most polynomial (in the security parameter n). If less than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt, the size of the domain is constant, and the functionality is deterministic, then our protocols are efficient even when the number of parties is log log n. On the negative side, we show that when the number of parties is super-constant, 1/p-secure protocols are not possible when the size of the domain is polynomial. Thus, our feasibility results for 1/p-secure computation are essentially tight. We further motivate our results by constructing protocols with stronger guarantees: If in the execution of the protocol there is a majority of honest parties, then our protocols provide full security. However, if only a minority of the parties are honest, then our protocols are 1/p-secure. Thus, our protocols provide the best of both worlds, where the 1/p-security is only a fall-back option if there is no honest majority.
AB - A protocol for computing a functionality is secure if an adversary in this protocol cannot cause more harm than in an ideal computation, where parties give their inputs to a trusted party which returns the output of the functionality to all parties. In particular, in the ideal model such computation is fair - all parties get the output. Cleve (STOC 1986) proved that, in general, fairness is not possible without an honest majority. To overcome this impossibility, Gordon and Katz (Eurocrypt 2010) suggested a relaxed definition - 1/p-secure computation - which guarantees partial fairness. For two parties, they construct 1/p-secure protocols for functionalities for which the size of either their domain or their range is polynomial (in the security parameter). Gordon and Katz ask whether their results can be extended to multiparty protocols. We study 1/p-secure protocols in the multiparty setting for general functionalities. Our main result is constructions of 1/p-secure protocols that are resilient against any number of corrupt parties provided that the number of parties is constant and the size of the range of the functionality is at most polynomial (in the security parameter n). If less than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt, the size of the domain is constant, and the functionality is deterministic, then our protocols are efficient even when the number of parties is log log n. On the negative side, we show that when the number of parties is super-constant, 1/p-secure protocols are not possible when the size of the domain is polynomial. Thus, our feasibility results for 1/p-secure computation are essentially tight. We further motivate our results by constructing protocols with stronger guarantees: If in the execution of the protocol there is a majority of honest parties, then our protocols provide full security. However, if only a minority of the parties are honest, then our protocols are 1/p-secure. Thus, our protocols provide the best of both worlds, where the 1/p-security is only a fall-back option if there is no honest majority.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80051969535&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_16
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AN - SCOPUS:80051969535
SN - 9783642227912
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 277
EP - 296
BT - Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2011 - 31st Annual Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 31st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2011
Y2 - 14 August 2011 through 18 August 2011
ER -