שלילת אבהות בהסכמה

This article deals with three situations in which a man and awoman who are the genetic parents of a child, agree that thefather's genetic parenthood will have no practical and legalsignificance and that the mother will serve as the sole parent, forthe purpose of all rights, responsibilities and obligations. (1) An agreementto deny parenthood made at the stage when the mother is pregnant, orshortly after birth; (2) a sperm donation from an anonymous donor; and (3)a sperm donation from a known donor.The first part of the article presents three lines of thought that relate todifferent aspects of the situation. One line of thought is based on thecontractual point of view. The second focuses on the best interests of the childand the distinction between the best interests of the hypothetical future child andthose of the specific child. The third is focused on the right to parenthood. Thearticle shows that none of the explanations proposed is sufficient toprovide a coherent explanation for the existing position of Israeli lawand/or to provide a satisfactory policy for regulating these three situations.The second part of the article presents an alternative approach. Thisapproach seeks to replace the private aspect reflected in each of the viewsdiscussed above with a broad network of thinking about parenting knownas the “institutional-public approach to parenting”. The article explainsthat Israeli law rejects the “agreement to deny parenting” because itcontradicts the need to shape parenthood as an institution that reflectsirreversible, non-commercial responsibility, focused on the best interestsof the child and the relationships between the children and parents. Thearticle will further argue that because of their support for the right toparenthood of single mothers, Israeli law and Western law in general, seekto construct a social category of “donor”, referring to the “right” person tohelp women or couples realize their desire to become parents. The articleproposes some mechanisms and limitations that may permit the donationmechanism without undermining the institution of parenthood and the ethos this represents. The position that rejects donation from a knowndonor is justified because this creates a category of “partial” parenting thatmay harm the well-being of the child. In addition, it also blurs the linebetween categories and opens the door for a person to act as a quasi-parentwithout taking full responsibility for his/her children, thus harming theconcept of the “parenting institution”.