An outstanding feature of our economy is the protection against economic competition enjoyed by auditors and land-assessors. This protection is maintained primarily by control exercised through their professional bodies over the number of new licentiates. This paper argues that a profession of quasi-jurisdictional nature, which essence is to assess payments between government and the private sector, is a profession which will be protected by the Legislator against economic competition. This protection is granted not because the profession-holders "take over" the government sector which is supposed to supervise them, but rather because it is in the government's interest that the said professionals should enjoy higher than normal profits. Consequently, the professional licence will have a high economic value and its holder will not be tempted to give in to the pressures of the private sector he serves. The economic value of the licence equals the fine imposed by the licence being denied. The higher this "fine" is, so is its deterrent value against illegal actions.
|Published - 1988