Abstract
The originality of Leibowitz's thought is revealed in the fundamental problem he poses as well as in its solution. This question he raises is: How to validate religious commitment without resorting to truth claims about the world and about God? The solution he offers is to construe Jewish religion as a normative moral system rather than as a system of truth claims. This approach, together with the assumption about the incommensurability of values, leads to a pluralistic religious worldview. In this article, I examine the thesis and its implications and show that, although Leibowitz rejected the latter, he could not thereby undermine their validity.
Translated title of the contribution | Leibowitz—The Man Against his Thought: The Name of a Dog or Natural Rights |
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Original language | Hebrew |
Pages (from-to) | 131-143 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabbalah |
Volume | 38 |
State | Published - 1997 |
IHP Publications
- ihp
- Commandments (Judaism)
- Jewish philosophy, Modern
- Leibowitz, Yeshayahu -- 1903-1994
- Values
- ליבוביץ, ישעיהו -- 1903-1994
- מצוות (יהדות)
- ערכים
- פילוסופיה יהודית מודרנית