התכנון המדיני־אסטרטגי והערכת המודיעין הלאומית בתקופת האינתיפאדה הראשונה

The military is one of the largest and most centralized organizations in most countries. Since the early days of the State of Israel, the military echelon has assumed broad responsibility that goes beyond what is customary in democratic countries. The Intelligence Directorate and the Planning Division enjoyed the status of almost exclusive sources of national intelligence assessments and political-security planning, respectively. The purpose of this article is to examine and describe the extent of the military echelon’s influence on the political echelon, with emphasis on political-strategic planning and national intelligence assessments. The article discusses the influence of the military, as a bureaucratic organization, on the political echelon in the decision-making process in the political-security sphere, arguing that decisions on foreign and security issues do not always favor the much more powerful organization. To this end, I will examine the model of bureaucratic-organizational dynamics as manifested in Israel during the First Intifada. The starting point of the bureaucratic-organizational decision-making model developed by Halperin and Ellison is that there is organizational heterogeneity within the government system, and decisions reflect the different interests and strengths of the decision-makers and organizations taking part in the process in a manner that always favors the most powerful.