הקמת היאחזויות נח"ל במערב הנגב ערב מבצע קדש: הניסיון וכישלונו

This article examines the story of the establishment in 1956 of six Nahal settlements in the western Negev, and through this lens explores the relationship that developed between the civil and military authorities in Israel regarding the security and economic goals of the frontier settlements. The settlements were established to fortify the expected invasion routes of the Egyptian army in their advance from Sinai to Be’er Sheba, and the military did not consider economic factors (e.g. agricultural land and water) when choosing their location. The agricultural aspects of these settlements,according to IDF officers, was only a pretext for an Israeli military presence adjacent to the border.The main argument of the article is that military authorities managed to force their absolute preference for security needs over the economic requirements of the civil administration. In this victory,however, were planted the seeds of the failure of these settlements,and their prestige withered once the security threat on the Egyptian border was removed.This failure also had a long-term impact, with the subsequent reduction of investment by the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department in the establishment of Nahal settlements over the following five years. This was due, amongst other reasons, to the monetary investment that had gone to waste in the western Negev settlements.