העיתון ‘ההד' כמעצב תרבות חרדית־ציונית בהשראת הראי"ה קוק, 1933–1926

Among the initial moves of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (the name of the Imperial British army in Palestine) under General Edmund Allenby, in the opening phase of the Megiddo Campaign in September 1918 – the last campaign in northern Palestine during the First World War – was a deep-penetration cavalry raid on the German-Ottoman General Headquarters in Nazareth. Its aim was to capture General von Liman von Sanders, commander-in-chief of the enemy in Palestine, and to incapacitate his staff, in order to paralyze its command and control system and ruin its ability to affect the campaign. The raid, carried out by a cavalry brigade, partially destroyed the headquarters, but was compelled to withdraw without accomplishing its main task – taking von Sanders prisoner. Hitherto, historiography has put the blame for this failure on the shoulders of the brigade commander on the one hand, and on unfortunate circumstances on the other hand. This article, based on archival documentation, a reexamination of the sources and an exploration of the terrain, concludes that the existing narrative echoes the desire of senior commanders to avoid responsibility. The failure derived, first and foremost, from the conduct of all higher echelons above brigade level, and from a reliance on what was essentially defective intelligence.