בין מלחמת "יש ברירה" לרציפות תפיסת הביטחון הישראלית: עיון מחודש בתפיסות שהובילו למלחמת לבנון הראשונה

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Abstract

The Israeli public largely views Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 as anunusual event, a deviation from the path that Israel had followed until then. Unlike otherwars, Israel did not fight in the Lebanon War for security purposes, but for the politicalaims and whims of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.Therefore, this war is considered a war of choice, waged by Israel when it was not underan existential threat. The claim that the Lebanon War constitutes an exceptional event inIsraeli history is at the heart of this article. In order to determine whether the Lebanon Warwas indeed a deviation from the “right path” of the State of Israel, we examine it in lightof the Israeli security doctrine that had led Israel’s decision-makers until then and that, tosome extent, continues to govern them to this day. Using the security doctrine as a guide,we find that this war was not a deviation or an anomaly, but rather an application of Israelisecurity principles
Original languageHebrew
Pages (from-to)103-126
Number of pages24
Journalכתב העת הבינתחומי ללימודי המזרח התיכון
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023

RAMBI Publications

  • RAMBI Publications
  • National security -- Israel
  • Operation Peace for Galilee, 1982-1985
  • Israel -- Strategic aspects
  • Israel -- Politics and government -- 1977-1984

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